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Neil Gorsuch and the Return of Rule-of-Law Due
Process
By Nathan S. Chapman

Originally published at RealClear.com

Something curious happened at the Supreme Court last week. While the country was
glued to the Cirque du Trump, the rule of law made a comeback, revived by Neil
Gorsuch, whose place on the Court may prove to be one of Trump’s most important
legacies.
Unlike the partisan gerrymander and First Amendment cases currently pending before
the Court, immigration cases are usually long on textual analysis and short on grand
themes. Accordingly, court-watchers didn’t have especially high expectations
for Sessions v. Dimaya.
Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident who was convicted of first-degree burglary and
faced deportation. The conviction seemed to count as a crime that “by its nature,
involves substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, if the burglary were such a crime, he would be subject to deportation.
Dimaya argued that the statutory provision was too vague to give him adequate notice,
so deporting him would deprive him of liberty without due process of law. Although the
Court had ruled three years ago that a similar federal criminal law was
unconstitutionally vague, Dimaya’s case was distinguishable: The two laws were phrased
a little differently; courts usually think burglary is an inherently dangerous crime; and
aliens — even lawful resident aliens — don’t enjoy the full constitutional rights of U.S.
citizens.
But a bare majority of the Court concluded that the “substantial risk” of “physical force”
provision was too vague to authorize a deportation — even for burglary. While the
holding was perhaps unsurprising, Justice Gorsuch’s solo opinion, which provided the
crucial fifth vote, was remarkable in every way. It reveals a lot about Gorsuch as a
constitutional jurist and reintroduces a cross-partisan notion of due process as a
guarantee of the rule of law.
First, Gorsuch’s opinion was deeply originalist. His judgment was based on a searching
review of legal materials that would have been familiar to jurists at the time of our
country’s founding, including a number of early state and federal cases declining to
apply vague statutes. His conclusion? The “void for vagueness doctrine … serves as a
faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the
framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under our Constitution.” Based on this
opinion, Gorsuch appears to be every bit as committed to an originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation as his predecessor, Justice Scalia, was — perhaps more so.
Second, Gorsuch married careful historical scrutiny with candor and sensitivity for how
our legal system has changed over time. This is where he and Justice Thomas parted

ways. Thomas’s dissenting opinion provides a careful historical argument against
invalidating vague laws for lack of due process. He thinks such laws may be forbidden by
the separation of powers, but not by the Due Process Clause. And, in any case, he thinks
the courts should rarely invalidate a vague law, choosing instead to decline to enforce
where it does not clearly fit the facts. This is a sensible view of the historical material,
but it gives no weight to numerous changes to the legal system since the Founding. One
cannot return to the Founding era’s constitutional understanding on a retail basis
without unbalancing subsequent wholesale legal changes. (This is putting aside
important social, moral, economic, and political changes.)
Gorsuch’s opinion, by contrast, deploys a subtler view of the relationship between
historical understanding and the law today. He shows that many Founding-era jurists
(though not all) believed resident aliens were entitled to due process. His analysis thus
accounts for plural understandings at the Founding. He also shows that lawful
permanent residents, by virtue of affirmative acts of Congress, enjoy a different “liberty”
interest today than they did at the founding. The basic requirements of due process may
not change, but underlying rights to “life, liberty, and property” might. Such changes
would interact dynamically with due process claims.
Gorsuch also questions the relevance of a strict distinction between criminal and civil
cases. He notes that the Founding generation understood civil deprivations of rights to
be subject to due process (as I have recently argued), and that today some civil
punishments are more onerous than their criminal counterparts — even for the same
conduct. One swallow does not a spring make, but Gorsuch appears to be more
comfortable than other modern justices at incorporating legal change into his
application of the original understanding of the Constitution. He avoids both the
mistake of ignoring legal change altogether and that of sacrificing continuity of
constitutional meaning on the altar of progress. Scholars such as Christopher Green
have argued that such an approach, perhaps counterintuitively, may be entirely faithful
to the original understanding of constitutional provisions.
Third and perhaps most remarkably, Gorsuch uses this historical material to articulate a
position that is potentially more far-reaching and more protective of individual rights
than even the plurality opinion does. That opinion, penned by Justice Kagan and joined
by the three other liberal members of the Court, extends due process to Dimaya in part
because of their view of the importance of the right of continued residence. Gorsuch
goes considerably further. His view of the Due Process Clause would require the
legislature to set out clear laws before anyone is deprived of any legal interest in “life,
liberty, or property.”
Without that clarity, executive officials and courts wind up effectively exercising the
lawmaking power reserved for the legislature, as Michael McConnell and I have
argued elsewhere. In that case, the people have no notice and little say over the content
of the law; rights are subject to the opinions — or political expediency — of unelected
officials and judges. But due process of law was originally understood to guarantee that
the deprivation of rights would be subject to law.

Congress may not function as efficiently as many would like, but that is no excuse for
executive officials or courts to supplant its constitutional role at the expense of people
like Dimaya. As Justice Jackson said in his famous opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, the
Due Process Clause, together with the president’s responsibility to enforce the laws,
“signif[ies] about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of
men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”
While the vision of due process Justice Gorsuch invoked differs from modern
“procedural” and “substantive” due process, there is surely room for it alongside those
doctrines. As Gorsuch’s analysis illustrates, rule-of-law due process doesn’t reliably lead
to conservative or liberal results. It is not a panacea for perceived Supreme Court
partisanship. But it may portend a return of the rule of law — within, and through, due
process.
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